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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the judgment within six months as provided by statute.' How-
ever, in this instance that judgment was void for want of juris-
diction and could be attacked at a later date."
There is also an inference that now the defendants are
estopped ' from raising the jurisdictional point. This seems to
be because of the committments of counsel, and also because of
the fact that no appeal was made within the six month period
provided by statute. The majority of the court seem to men-
tion estoppel not as the basis for their opinion, but rather as
dictum. A query could be raised as to whether all the ele-
ments necessary to constitute an estoppel are present. Cer-
tainly for counsel to wait twenty-nine months for an answer
to be filed seems like an unwarranted reliance.
It would appear that the Supreme Court of Montana ar-
rived at the wrong conclusion in the Sherbourne Case. Justice
Angstman sums up well in this statement:
"There is no case supporting the essential conclusion
that admission of service not exhibited to the court con-
stitutes a return of summons at the time the admission
was made."
Waldo N. Spanglo.
-R.C.M. 1935, §§9187 and 9732.
2State v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District In and for Gal-
latin County, (1909), 38 Mont. 166, 99 P. 291, 65 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1098,
129 Am. St. Rep. 636; State v. District Court of the Tenth Judicial
District In and for Fergus County (1919), 55 Mont. 602, 179 P. 831.
Hodson v. O'Keefe (1925), 71 Mont. 322, 229 P. 722; Ealy v. McGahen
(1933) 37 N.M. 248, 21 P.(2d) 84; 3 Am. Juri., Appearances, §22; 50
Corpus Juris 598, (92).
"Waddell v. School Dist. No. 2 of Yellowstone County (1925), 74 Mont.
91, 238 P. 884.
INHERITANCE TAX ON JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY
A 0OMMXNT ON IN RE PERIER'S ESTATE1
I.
Until recently, the lawyers of Montana were prone to be-
lieve that jointly owned property was subject to inheritance
tax at 50% of its full market value. The Perier's Estate de-
cision has made this line of thought obsolete, and removes what
was thought to be a safe technique for minimizing inheritance
tax. In place of that simple mathematical formula, the elusive
"contemplation of death" concept must now be considered
'State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1948) ...... Mont ........ 195 P. (2d) 989.
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whenever an estate contains a joint bank account or real estate
held in joint tenancy. Government bonds payable to either of
two named persons, while not joint property, present a similar
problem.
The factual situation of the principal case is a common
one in Montana today. Mae H. Perier was a widow. Her hus-
band died September 7, 1943. Eighteen days later, on Sep-
tember 25, 1943, Mrs. Perier created three joint bank accounts,
payable to herself or another named person or the survivor.
A fourth such joint bank account was created on September
27, 1943, and a fifth was created on May 22, 1945. Mrs. Perier
died on March 11, 1946, age 63 years. She had no children.
A cousin was named co-owner in four of the joint bank ac-
counts and a sister as co-owner of the fifth joint account.
Five Series "G" U. S. Savings bonds were purchased by
Mrs. Perier on September 1, 1942, one on March 1, 1943, one
on August 1, 1943, two on September 1, 1944, and one on July
1, 1944. These bonds were all payable to Mrs. Perier, or, in
the alternative, to a person named on the face of the bond.
They were kept in decedent's safety deposit box and none of
the alternative payees had access to the safety deposit box, or
ever attempted to exercise any control over the bonds.
The District Court of Silver Bow County found Sub-sec-
tion 6 of 10400.1, R.C.M. 1935, applied to the joint bank ac-
counts and to the savings bonds. It accordingly imposed a tax
measured by one-half of the joint bank accounts and the sav-
ings bonds.
Sub-section 6 reads as follows: "Joint estates. Whenever
any property, real or personal, is held in the joint names
of two or more persons, or as tenants by the entirety
or is deposited in banks or other institutions or deposi-
taries in the joint names of two or more persons and
payable to either or the survivor, upon the death of one
of such persons, the right of the surviving tenant by the
entirety, joint tenant, or joint tenants, person or per-
sons, to the immediate ownership or possession of such
property shall be deemed a transfer of one-half or other
proper fraction thereof as though the property to which
such transfer relates belonged to the tenants by the en-
tirety, joint tenants, or joint depositors as tenants in
common, and had been bequeathed or devised to the sur-
viving tenant by the entirety, joint tenant, or joint de-
positor, by will, except such part thereof as may be
shown to have originally belonged to the survivor and
never to have belonged to the decedent."
2
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Upon appeal by the State Board of Equalization, the Su-
preme Court reversed and held that the entire amount in the
joint bank accounts and the full market value of the savings
bonds were subject to the inheritance- tax. The Court was
divided three to two as to the joint bank accounts, but a4-l
agreed that -the savings bonds were subject to tax at full value.
The result of the case is reasonably satisfactory, but the meth-
od by which it is reached leaves much to be desired The ma-
jority applied Sub-section 6 to 50% of the joint bank ac-
counts, just as the District Court had done, but went on to ap-
ply Sub-section 3 of 10400.1, R.C.M. to the other 50% of the
joint bank accounts. As to the savings bonds, the entire court
held that Sub-section 6 did not apply at all, but that Sub-
section 3 applied on the entire market value. Sub-section 3
reads as follows: "In contemplation of death. When the
transfer is of property made by a resident or by a non-
resident when such nonresident 's property is within the
state, or within its jurisdiction, by deed, grant, bargain,
sale or gift, made in contemplation of the death of the
grantor, vendor, or donor, or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after such death. Every
transfer by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift, made with-
in three years prior to the death of the grantor, vendor,
or donor, of a material part of his estate, or in the na-
ture of a final disposition or distribution thereof, and
without a fair consideration in money or money's worth
shall, unless shown to the contrary be deemed to have
been made in contemplation of death within the meaning
of this section."
II.
Much of the majority opinion, as written by Justice Met-
calf, is devoted to determining that a valid gift inter vivos
occurred upon the creation of the joint bank accounts, and
Justice Angstman's dissent is directed against that proposi-
tion. The clash of opinion with regard to the requisites of a
2Justice Gibson, in a separate dissenting opinion, is the only member
of the court to touch upon the factor of the size of the joint bank ac-
counts. The theory of this comment supports taxing joint bank ac-
counts in full when they are created in contemplation of death. How-
ever, the author does believe that Justice Gibson correctly held that
contemplation of death should not have been presumed upon the facts
of the principal case, since the joint bank accounts were such a small
percentage of the total estate. For the sake of brevity, that factor
is not discussed in this comment, but it is important as a ground for
distinguishing future cases.3Justice Angstman, in a vigorous dissent, notes that the State Board
of Equalization had never advanced the theory adopted by the Court.
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gift under property law is misleading to the reader because
the support given each opinion magnifies the issue to an un-
warranted importance. It is here contended that an improper
test is thus developed, one that will lead to much additional
litigation. It does not give a practicing attorney a satisfac-
tory guide and will lead to unfortunate results.
Confusion inevitably follows when the technicalities of
property law are used to test the tax consequences of a trans-
action.
The United States Supreme Court blazed a more sophisti-
cated trail in the leading case of Helvering v. Hallock where
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, said "The im-
portation of these distinctions and controversies from the law
of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes
a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the same inter-
ests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable
or not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which
may have their historic justification but possess no relevance
for tax purposes. These unwitty diversities of the law of
property derive from medieval concepts as to the necessity
of a continuous seisin. Distinctions which originated upon a
feudal economy when land dominated social relations are
peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so
largely directed toward intangible wealth." Such a holding
eliminates the complexities of property law from the already
subtle distinctions in the taxation field.
The opinion of the majority of the Montana Court is here
criticized since it is based upon such a controversial rule of
property law. The dissenting opinions are no better, since they
merely disagree with the interpretation of the property law
rule. The majority held that one-half of the joint bank ac-
count was taxable under Sub-section 3 by finding (1) that
the creation of the joint bank account was a "completed gift,"
(2) that it was a gift of a one-half interest in the joint bank
account, and (3) the gift was a transfer in contemplation of
death as the joint bank accounts were created within three
years immediately preceding the death of the donor and the
presumption thereby raised was not rebutted by the taxpayers.
Sub-section 6 was applied to the remaining half of the joint
bank accounts.
Justice Metcalf, for the majority, refers to the intention
4(1940) 309 U.S. 106, 84 L.Ed. 604, 60 S.Ct. 444, 125 A.L.R. 1368.
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of the legislature in adopting Sub-section 3 and quotes from
the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in U. S. v. Wells:' "The
dominant purpose is to reach substitutes for testamentary dis-
position and thus to prevent the evasion of the estate tax."
Justice Angstman believed the legislative intent was expressed
by the enacting of Sub-section 6 dealing specifically with joint-
ly owned property. He stated, "In legal effect, the legislature,
by saying that one-half is taxable, has said that the other one-
half is not taxable."'  With all due regard to the opinion of
Justice Angstman, it is hereby contended that Sub-section 6
simply adds another string to our tax-gatherer's bow, by calling
for a tax on at least an aliquot portion of the property in a
proper case.
It is here contended that the purpose of taxing all sub-
stitutes for testamentary disposition would have been better
carried out if the Court had applied Sub-section 3 to 100o of
the joint bank accounts instead of using it for only 50% and
using Sub-section 6 for the other 50%. Sub-section 3 could
have been used in either of two ways to tax the joint bank ac-
counts on 100% of their total amount-as a transfer in con-
templation of death, or as a transfer intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after such death of the trans-
feror.
A careful analysis of the statutes supports this thesis. Sec-
tion 10400.1' calls for an inheritance tax on a transfer of prop-
erty to any person within the state in certain described cases.
Sub-section 3 sets out one of these cases. It imposes the tax
5(1931) 283 U.S. 102, 51 SCt. 446, 450, 75 L.Ed. 867.
I .... Mont ..... 195 P.(2d) 989, 997.
7R.C.M. 1935 §10400.1: "A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon
any transfer of property, real, personal or mixed, or any interest
therein, or income therefrom in trust or otherwise, to any person, asso-
ciation or corporation except the state of Montana, or any of its in-
stitutions, county, town or municipal corporations within the state, for
strictly county, town, municipal or other public purposes, and corpora-
tions of this state organized under its laws, or voluntary associations,
organized solely for religious, charitable, or educational purposes,
which shall use the property so transferred exclusively for the pur-
poses of their organization, within the state, in the following cases,
except as hereinafter provided:
(1) By a resident of state .......................................................
(2) Nonresident's property within state ....................................
(3) In contemplation of death ..............................
(4) W hen imposed .................................................................
(5) Transfer under power of appointment ...............................
(6) Joint estates ............................................................................
(7) Insurance part of estate ......................................................
(8) On clear market value-deductions ...............................
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on a transfer of property in contemplation of death or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death.
The Montana Supreme Court had difficulty with the word
"transfer." The majority felt it was necessary to have a com-
pleted gift as required by property law in order to find a trans-
fer. It is here contended that such was not the intention of the
legislature when the inheritance tax was enacted.
The word "transfer" is defined by Section 10400.43
R.C.M.8 as follows: ". . . the word 'transfer' as used in
this act shall be taken to include the passing of property
or any interest therein, in possession or enjoyment,
present or future, by inheritance, descent, devise, suc-
cession, bequest, grant, deed, bargain, sale, gift, or ap-
pointment in the manner herein prescribed to each in-
dividual, or corporation."
In Tyler v. U. S.,' the Supreme Court stated, "The ques-
tion . . . is, not whether there has been in the strict sense o.
that word, a transfer of the property by the death of the de-
cedent, or a receipt of it by right of succession, but whether
the death has brought into being or ripened for the survivor,
property rights of such character as to make appropriate the
imposition of a tax upon that result, to be measured, in whole
or in part, by the value of such rights. .... "
In the principal case, the creation of the joint bank ac-
counts resulted in a shifting of an economic benefit from the
deceased to a named survivor, and hence, constituted a transfer
8R.C.M. 1935, §10400.43: "The words "estate" and "Property" as used
in this act shall be taken to mean the real and personal property or
interest therein passing or transferred to individual legatees, devisees,
heirs, next of kin, grantees, donees, or vendees, and not as the proper-
ty or interest therein of the decedent, grantor, donor, or vendor, and
shall include all personal property within or without the state. The
word "transfer" as used in this act shall be taken to include the
passing of property or any interest therein, in possession or enjoy-
ment, present or future, by inheritance, descent, devise, succession, be-
quest, grant, deed, bargain, sale, gift, or appointment in the manner
herein prescribed to each individual or corporation. The word "de-
cedent" as used in this act shall include the testator, intestate, grantor,
bargainor, vendor, or donor. "Intangible" or "intangible property"
when used in this act without other qualifications, shall be taken to
include all moneys, stocks, bonds, notes, securities and credits of all
kinds, secured or unsecured. The words "county treasurer," "public
administrator" and "county attorney," as used in this act shall be
taken to mean the treasurer, public administrator, and county attorney
of the county in which the district court has jurisdiction of the pro-
ceedings."
'(1929) 281 U.S. 497, 503, 504, 74 L.Ed. 991, 998, 999 50 S.Ct. 356, 69
A.L.R. 758.
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 10 [1949], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol10/iss1/12
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
for tax purposes, whether or not it was a completed gift ac-
cording to property law.
"Legislative intent" is a handy whipping post frequently
used to support personal opinion as to what the law should be.
In the principal case, both the majority and the dissenting
opinions claim to be based on legislative intent. It is doubtful
that our Montana legislature can be credited with having any
definite intention as regards this type of legal problem, but
it is here submitted that the best indication of legislative in-
tent is found in Section 10400.43 where the word transfer is
defined in the broadest possible language. It indicates an in-
tent to reach all substitutes for testamentary dispositions.
The Montana Court unanimously agreed that the savings
bonds were not held in the joint names of two or more persons;
hence, Sub-section 6 could not apply. It held "the bonds, then,
were the property of the decedent so long as she retained them
in her possession."'" In this instance, the court did not experi-
ence the same difficulty with the word "transfer." It ob-
served, "They constituted a transfer of personal property
without consideration intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment of the named donees at or after the death of Mrs.
Perier and were therefore taxable by Sub-section 3 of section
10400.1, R.C.M. 1935, on their full market value."" The court
could have used the same method with regard to the joint bank
accounts. In the Montana case, In Re Wadsworth's Estate,"
our Supreme Court quoted the language of Chief Justice
Hughes in U. S. v. Wells" as follows:
"The quality which brings the transfer within the
statute is indicated by the context and manifest purpose.
Transfers in contemplation of death are included within
the same catagory, for the purpose of taxation, with
transfers intended to take effect at or after death of the
transferor. The dominant purpose is to reach substitutes
for testamentary disposition and thus to prevent the
evasion of the estate tax. . . . There is no escape from
the necessity of carefully scrutinizing the circumstances
of each case to detect the dominant motive of the donor
in the light of his bodily and mental conditions, and thus
to give effect to the manifest purpose of the statute. .... "
Since it is the intent of Mrs. Perier at the time of the
....... Mont ........ 195 P.(2d) 989, 997.
nId.
2(1932) 92 Mont. 135, 145, 11 P.(2d) 788, 791.
"(1930) 283 U.S. 102, 51 S.Ct. 446, 75 L.Ed. 867.
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creation of the joint bank accounts that is important here, " we
must look to any circumstances which may help determine such
intent. The facts show that the first three joint bank accounts
were created on September 25, 1943 (18 days after the death
of her husband); another was created two days later, and the
last joint bank account was created on May 22, 1945. The
savings bonds were purchased on various dates, commencing
with September 1, 1942 and ending on July 1, 1944. The
Montana court found that Mrs. Perier was motivated by the
prescribed intent in acquiring these bonds on such dates. It is
reasonable to believe that the intent of the donor during this
period was the same with respect to the joint bank accounts.
The fact that the alternative payees made no withdrawals from
the joint bank accounts further supports the contention that
they were intended to take effect at or after Mrs. Perier's
death.
III.
In spite of our dissatisfaction with the theory adopted by
the majority of the court, we must nevertheless consider it the
law on the subject and draw our conclusions with respect to
the future application of the ruling.
It would now appear that all savings bonds made payable
to either of two named persons and kept in the possession of
the purchaser, will be taxable in full upon the death of the pur-
chaser.'5 Over half of the savings bonds held by Mrs. Perier
were purchased more than three years preceeding her death.
They were, nevertheless, taxable as a transfer intended to take
effect at or after her death.
Joint bank accounts created within the three year period
will be taxable in full unless the statutory presumption can be
rebutted. Those created more than three years preceding the
date of death may also be taxable in full if the surrounding
circumstances indicate that the joint account was created as
a substitute for a testamentary disposition. The bodily and
mental condition of the decedent will have to be considered in
each case. The attitude of the so-called donee will also be im-
147 Am. Jur., Banks, 427. To constitute a joint deposit o4 a gift there
must be an intention to make the gift; if there is no such intention,
the survivor is not entitled to the fund under the gift theory. For
example, the donee acquires no ownership in the fund, or any part of
it, where the only purpose of creating the joint account was to enable
the donee to draw funds for the benefit of the donor.
"The same result would follow where the bonds are payable on death to
a named beneficiary.
8
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portant, and where the donee has made no withdrawals or de-
posits to the joint bank account, it will be difficult to disprove
the claim that the joint account was created in contemplation
of death, no matter when the joint account was created. The
existence and use of other bank accounts might also have a
bearing on the problem.
Where the surviving joint payee has made more than
nominal deposits and withdrawals, there is less cause for hold-
ing that the joint bank account was created in contemplation
of death. Withdrawals by the surviving payee will make the
problem particularly troublesome in view of the theory adopted
by the majority of the Montana Court. To illustrate this
point, assume a situation similar to the principal case, but
where the donee has withdrawn the full amount prior to the
death of the person who made the deposit. Under the theory
adopted by the majority, one-half of the amount deposited in
the account will be taxable as a transfer in contemplation of
death, but there will be nothing in the account at the date of
death, so that Sub-section 6 will not be applicable and 50% of
the joint account will thereby avoid taxation.
Real estate held by husband and wife as joint tenants is
also vulnerable and may be held subject to tax of 100% of its
full market value under the theory adopted in the Perier case.
If the property was acquired within three years prior to the
date of death, and if all of the consideration was advanced by
the deceased joint tenant, the statutory presumption will ap-
ply. "Contemplation of death" could probably be found
present, as a matter of fact, in many instances where the prop-
erty is acquired more than three years prior to the date of
death.
In writing this comment, various views have been cited
as to the intention of our legislature in regard to taxing jointly
owned property. The problem gave our present Supreme Court
much difficulty as evidenced by the three opinions of the
judges in the decision in the principal case; the Montana Re-
ports contain other cases decided since the enactment of our
inheritance tax statute which involved the same difficulty; and
yet, many questions remain in the minds of Montana lawyers
as to the legislative intent. Is it the duty of the legislature
to read the Supreme Court decisions and determine if their
intent is being carried out? If so, silence by the legislature
will affirm the present decision. However, a change in mem-
bership of the Supreme Court, when the exact legislative intent
9
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is not clear, and the court is split 3-2 on an important statute,
may result in a contrary holding in a case similar in facts. It
would seem appropriate for our legislature to remove the neces-
sity of speculating as to its intention by amending our in-
heritance tax statutes. The Federal estate tax rule' could be
used as a pattern for our inheritance tax on jointly owned
property. There are obvious administrative advantages to
paralleling the federal rule. We would fall heir to the federal
cases interpreting that statute, and it would give us an equita-
ble rule. With our present statutes, as applied in the Perier
case, a property owner has nothing to gain and much to lose
by holding property in joint tenancy.
Sidney P. Kurth.
'Internal Revenue Code, §811. The value of the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his
death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever
situated, except real property situated outside of the United States.
(e) Joint interests.-To the extent of the interest therein held as joint
tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the
entirety by the decedent and spouse, or deposited, with any person
carrying on the banking business, in their joint names and payable to
either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may be shown to
have originally belonged to such other person and never to have been
received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth: Provided,
That where such property or any part thereof, or part of the con-
sideration with which such property was acquired, is shown to have
been at any time acquired by such other person from the decedent for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, there shall be excepted only such part of the value of such
property as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by such
other person: Provided further, That where any property has been
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, as a tenancy by the
entirety by the decedent and spouse, then to the extent of one-half
of the value thereof, or, where so acquired by the decedent and any
other person as joint tenants and their interests are not otherwise
specified or fixed by law, then to the extent of the value of a frac-
tional part to be determined by dividing the value of the property by
the number of joint tenants.
ANIMALS AT LARGE ON THE HIGHWAY
A dearth of Supreme Court decisions exists in Montana
on the relative rights of drivers of automobiles and of owners
of livestock involved in collisions on the highway, nor are there
any Montana statutes directly in point. Consideration is here
given to Montana statutes relating to trespassing animals and
to decisions in other jurisdictions regarding animals on high-
ways as well as to Montana decisions on related matters to in-
10
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